Coordinating Machine Politics and Clientelism: Variation in Non-Programmatic Electoral Strategies

Description of the granted funding

Incumbents in authoritarian regimes and new democracies can use a variety of non-programmatic electoral strategies, such as electoral fraud and electoral clientelism, to skew the ‘electoral playing field' in their favour. However, these electoral strategies are by no means cost-free or necessarily that efficient, and require complex delegation and coordination at several levels of the electoral ‘machine'. This project is part of emerging comparative literature that investigates how various contextual conditions within countries mitigate the delegation problems associated with the coordination of electoral malfeasance and electoral clientelism. These substantively and normatively important questions are investigated with original qualitative and quantitative data, as well as experimental methods. The project has great potential for making important contributions to the comparative literature on democratization and authoritarian politics.
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Starting year

2018

End year

2024

Granted funding

Inga Saikkonen Orcid -palvelun logo
438 870 €

Related funding decisions

353296
Research costs of Academy Research Fellows(2022)
12 663 €
319883
Research costs of Academy Research Fellows(2018)
39 025 €

Funder

Research Council of Finland

Funding instrument

Academy research fellows

Other information

Funding decision number

316897

Fields of science

Political science

Research fields

Valtiotieteet

Identified topics

politics, democracy