Coordinating Machine Politics and Clientelism: Variation in Non-Programmatic Electoral Strategies
Description of the granted funding
Incumbents in authoritarian regimes and new democracies can use a variety of non-programmatic electoral strategies, such as electoral fraud and electoral clientelism, to skew the ‘electoral playing field' in their favour. However, these electoral strategies are by no means cost-free or necessarily that efficient, and require complex delegation and coordination at several levels of the electoral ‘machine'. This project is part of emerging comparative literature that investigates how various contextual conditions within countries mitigate the delegation problems associated with the coordination of electoral malfeasance and electoral clientelism. These substantively and normatively important questions are investigated with original qualitative and quantitative data, as well as experimental methods. The project has great potential for making important contributions to the comparative literature on democratization and authoritarian politics.
Show moreStarting year
2018
End year
2024
Granted funding
Related funding decisions
353296
Research costs of Academy Research Fellows(2022)
12 663 €
319883
Research costs of Academy Research Fellows(2018)
39 025 €
Funder
Research Council of Finland
Funding instrument
Academy research fellows
Other information
Funding decision number
316897
Fields of science
Political science
Research fields
Valtiotieteet
Identified topics
politics, democracy